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This paper documents the pattern, trend 
and determinants of migration in Africa 
using rich cross-country migration 
matrix data and household surveys from 
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria and 
Senegal. Results show that despite 
increase in the absolute number of 
migrants, Africa, particularly Sub-
Saharan Africa has one of the lowest rate 
of emigration in the world and a majority 
of them migrate to other African 
countries signifying the importance of 
south-south migration. Poorer countries 
generally have lower rate of emigration  
and higher rate of intra-African migrant. 
Bad socio-economic conditions generally 
seem to lead to higher rate of emigration 
by highly skilled individuals.  Generally, 
migration is driven by motives to 
improve livelihoods with notable 
evidence on changes in labor market 
status. Often, self-employed or 
unemployed émigré ended up in wage 
employment. The paper outlines policy 
issues emerging from the migration trend 
in Africa.    
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market adjustements 
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Introduction 
 
Migration and its role for development received substantial interest recently that sparked a large 
body of empirical studies to identify and provide evidence on the channels in which the two are 
interlinked. Resurgence of interest is further fuelled by the global economic and financial crisis 
that crippled labor markets across major destination countries in the OECD where the midterm 
outlook is still fragile. UNDP’s HDR(2009) focused on migration issues and OECD now has a 
dedicated annual publication on Migration Outlook where in its 2009 edition acknowledged that 
migration is a topical issue among the general public and noted that migrants in OECD countries 
bore the full force of the economic slowdown.  
 
Africa is known for its long history of migration within and beyond the vast continent. It is 
estimated today that the number of people with African descent that live outside of the continent 
is  close  to  140  million,  most  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  (Shinn,  2008).  The  bulk  of  these 
immigrants lost their ties altogether with the country of origin. Migrants that left their country in 
recent decades are able to keep in close contact with their relatives and maintain economic, 
social  and  political  relationship  with  the  country  of  origin  mainly  due  to  the  rapid  pace  of 
globalization and continuously improving, cheaper communication possibilities a fact that also 
contributed to the debate on the role of migration for development (Page and Plaza, 2005).   
 
There  is  mounting  evidence  from  recent  studies  suggesting  that  migrants,  particularly  from 
Africa are a reservoir of great potential that can be harnessed and unleashed to transform the 
development prospect of many countries and assist in the fight against poverty, hunger diseases 
and human suffering
1.  It is documented that migrants from Africa, particularly those from poor 
areas  generally  send  higher  remittances  to  their  relatives  that  served  as  a  countercyclical 
instrument during negative shocks
2. Nations throughout Africa receive a significant share of their 
foreign exchange from remittances, which is stable and predictable (Ratha, 2003). Possibilities 
for transfer of skill acquired over the years by return migrants could also create a significant 
externality to skill starved economies of most countries in Africa. I t is also acknowledged that 
most migrants face challenges that are complex in nature and magnitude that requires special 
attention and policy coordination.  
 
Most importantly, the change in demographic structure in both origin and destination countries in 
the decades ahead is expected to generate huge labor market imbalances at a global level that 
could create substantial impetus for migration. Projections indicate that global labor deficit could 
reach to the tune of 200 million in the next four decades of  which only 15% could be covered 
through migration amplifying the risk of sluggish growth, strain on the fiscal balance and welfare 
of the elderly for most destination countries. Migrant sending countries will have labor surplus 
particularly among the young and less educated who will be hard pressed to emigrate (Koettl, 
                                                 
1 See Ratha et al (2008) on the role of migrant resources to finance development in Sub Saharan Africa 
2 This is particularly very important in settings where the persistence of shocks is a major source of poverty. Studies 
from panel data in Africa have shown that close to 50% of household poverty is caused by shocks and in most cases 
households take very long time to recover once exposed to it (Bigsten and Shimeles, 2008, 2010; Dercon 2005).    6 
2010). Attaining a balance in the respective regions becomes a serious policy challenge in the 
years ahead. This paper provides a perspective on patterns and trends of migration in Africa by 
focusing on who is likely to migrate where and why and establish stylized facts that may be 
useful for policy making.  
 
The paper relied on a number of cross-country and household surveys to capture the pattern and 
trend of migration in Africa. The main data set used is the bilateral migration matrix compiled by 
the World Bank (2010a) which provides stock of migrants by origin as well as destination. Other 
macro  data  sets  used  in  this  study  include  migration  data  provided  by  the  United  Nations 
Population  Division  (2009),  the  Dockier  and  Marfour  (2005)  data  on  emigration  to  OECD 
countries and the Human Development Report (2009).  In addition, the Ghana Living Standard 
Measurement Survey of the 2005 round as well as household migration survey for six African 
countries collected in 2009 through the African Migration Project was used
3. The migration data 
collected from the household surveys consist of unique migration modules that has not been 
available in any survey to this date, such as socio -economic characteristics of migrants before 
and after migration took place, cost of migration, remittances and other issues.  
 
The next section presents migration trends, and patterns in Africa since the 1970s. Section 3 
discusses correlates of cross-country variations in the rate of emigration in Africa and some 
underlying factors. Section 4 provides recent evidence on the determinants of migration based on 
household  surveys.  Section  5  highlights  policy  challenges  and  Section  6  summarizes  and 
concludes the paper.  
 
Movement of people within and outside of Africa: trends and patterns  




The earliest attempt to document migration pattern in Africa pointed out that Africa, particularly 
Sub Saharan Africa, revealed huge wave of human movement that even exceeded the global 
average (Russel et al 1990).  Nevertheless, while emigration from Africa increased substantially 
in  the  last  decades  in  absolute  terms  incidence  of  emigration  or  the  proportion  of  stock  of 
emigrants in total population of the country of origin, is currently one of the lowest in the world 
though with marked variation across countries. According to the recent version of the bilateral 
migration matrix data by World Bank (2010)
4 it is estimated that in 2010 the number of people 
living in countries other than their birth place would be around 215 million of which  31 million 
                                                 
3 The household survey on migration in 2009 was conducted in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and South 
Africa. At the time of writing this paper surveys for Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Senegal were available.  
4 For details of this data see World Bank (2010), “Migration and Remittances Fact Book 2011”. Data on migration 
certainly is a serious problem in general and it is relatively acute in the case of Africa. Even though periodic 
household surveys have begun to appear since the 1990s  rarely were these survey instruments used to capture 
incidence  of  emigration,  particularly  international  emigration,  except  that  of  the  Ghana  Living  Standard 
Measurement  Survey  of  2005.  A  comparison  of  emigration  rate  from  the  household  survey  for  Ghana  (6%)-
Adams(2009)-  with  the  data  from  the  bilateral  matrix  (4.2%)    indicate  some  close  parallel  with  the  former  
understating slightly the migration rate.    7 
are from Africa, which represents respectively 3.% and 2.5% of total population (Table 1).  Of 
the  31  million  emigrants  from  Africa,  about  2.3  million  are  recognized  as  being  refugees 
displaced mainly by war, drought or other forms of natural disasters (UNPD, 2010). Certainly 
this figure suggests a major improvement compared with the situation reported in the 1990s with 
five million refugees or early 2000 where 1 out of every 5 emigrant was a refugee (Hatton and 
Williamson, 2003; Lucas, 2006). One could attribute the decline in the number of refugees partly 
to the decline in the frequency of coups, guerilla insurgency, government collapse, and incipient 
unrest that could lead to major civil war, factors known to significantly generate a flood of 
refugees in Africa. 
5 
 









Sub Saharan Africa  21.9                  861.6   2.5 
Northern Africa  8.7                  170.1   5.1 
Africa  30.6               1,031.7   3.0 
Latin America  30.2                  581.0   5.2 
East Asia and Pacific  21.7               1,974.4   1.1 
Europe and Central Asia  43.0                  403.7   10.7 
South Asia  26.7               1,644.0   1.6 
World  215.8               6,908.7   3.1 
Source: author’s computations  
 
 
The trend in net migration overtime reflects the tumultuous history of the continent, particularly 
that of Sub Saharan Africa where migration rates have fluctuated widely in the last three decades 
and a half for most countries
6. Understandably countries that experienced large scale conflict and 
war contributed to the periodic instability in the net movement of people from Africa
7. The last 
five years exhibited some easing of the average net migration as well as its variability across 
countries (Appendix Table 5). It needs to be emphasized that official data on migration in Africa, 
particularly that of Sub Saharan Africa significantly understates the actual movement of people 
for a number of reasons including inaccurate, infrequent and inconsistent recording by officials 
of movement of people across borders.   
 
Even though Africa has on the average one of the lowest rate of emigration, there is significant 
variation across countries. There are some countries with emigration rate that far exceeds the 
global  average.  For  example,  countries  with  relatively  high  rate   of  migration  (>10%  of 
population) are Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Sao Tome and Principe, Lesotho and 
                                                 
5 Hatton and Williamson (2003) reported that 45 refugees per one thousand in Africa was created by coups, and 
eminent civil war could lead also to 64 refugees per one thousand. Other important factors also include insurgency 
and government crisis.   
6 The data for net migration is based on residual estimates from demographic accounting exercises compiled by 
United Nations Population Division using census data.  
7 Hatton and Willamson (2003) estimated a regression model to capture determinants of net migration for Africa. 
Their findings suggest that movements of refugees, labor market conditions, specifically the wage gap and the 
supply of labor, particularly among the young explain a significant part of variation in net migration rates in Africa.    8 
Mali. One common feature of these countries is that they are relatively small in comparison to 
the average African country in terms of population and resources, and tend to have higher rate of 
international mobility given narrow or limited livelihood opportunities and dependency on a 
specific commodity for trade (Docquier and Schiff, 2009). Other extenuating factors are also at a 
play for such countries as Eritrea where protracted war for over three decades contributed to a 
massive wave of refugees that eventually settled indifferent parts of the world (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: rate of emigration from Africa (2010) 
 
 
Source: author’s computations based on the Bilateral Migration Matrix data 
 
A marked feature of movement of people across the globe is that at least half of it takes place 
within the same continent while the other half is transcontinental, except for emigrants from 
Latin America where the majority ended up in North America (Table 3)
8. For Africa, the intra-
Africa emigration rate is about 52%
9  which is lower than Europe (59%) and Asia (54.7%). 
However, for countries from Sub Saharan Africa this figure is close to 65%, which represents the 
largest intra-continental or south-south movement of people in the world. According to the 
bilateral migration data of the World Bank (2010), out of the 29 million stocks of emigrants from 
Africa in 2010, about 23% are from North Africa and the rest originate from Sub Saharan Africa.  
More than 90% of the emigrants from North Africa generally head to countries outside of Africa 
(see Table 4a and Table 4b for details). Generally, the intra -African migration is driven by the 
complexities of the history of state formation where colonial borders overlooked often linguistic 
and ethnic commonalities, as well as waves of internal and cross-border conflicts. It also reflects 
migration in search of job opportunities across neighboring countries.  
   
                                                 
8 See also HDR(2009), Shaw (2007) and Page and Plaza (2006) for useful discussion on the intra-African migration 
in Africa 
9 The rate of intra-Africa emigration reported in HDR(2009) and Table 4b here may be slightly different due to 





























Countries   9 
 
Table 3: Origin and destination of migrants by region 
  Destination Region 
Source Region  Africa  Asia  Europe  Latin America  Oceania  Other Regions 
Africa  52.6  12.5  28.9  0.2  0.9  4.9 
Asia  1.7  54.7  24.5  0.5  2.2  16.4 
Europe  2.5  16  59  2.5  4.6  15.4 
Latin America  1.1  5.1  10.3  13.4  0.3  69.8 
Oceania  1.4  8.7  20.1  0.6  46.7  22.5 
Source: HDR(2009) 
 
It is clear from Table 4a
10 that in most cases cross border migration dominates movement of 
people within the continent, particularly among migrants from West Africa where close to 90% 
of intra-African migration took place within the same sub-region. The other hotspot for migrants 
is Southern Africa, where economy of South Africa is evidently the powerhouse in attracting 
miners, and other potential job seekers from neighboring countries as well as from far away 
countries in East Africa where 27% of migrants from that region headed fo r Southern Africa. It 
is also interesting to note that close to 39% of all emigrants who remained in Africa headed to 
West Africa, followed by East Africa. North Africa stands out as an exception where few people 
migrate within the same region, rather most migrated to East Africa or Central Africa.   
 
Table 4a: Sub-regional emigration matrix for Africa: 2010 (%) 
Origin   East Africa  Central Africa  North Africa  Southern Africa  West  Africa 
East Africa  46.6  14.8  12.1  26.5  0 
Central Africa  30.2  50.3  5.7  6.5  7.2 
North Africa  51.2  26.9  20.4  0  1.5 
Southern Africa  34.6  0.1  0  65.3  0 
West  Africa  3.2  6.6  0.7  0  89.5 
Total  26.5  14  6.4  14.6  38.5 
Source: author’s computation based on the Migration Matrix data  
 
Figure 2 below provides further clarity on the fact that cross-border migration is a predominant 
pattern in Sub Saharan Africa. For instance, the most common destination country for emigrants 
from Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau and Mali is Cote D’Ivoire, and it has not changed despite its 
well known recent troubles. Likewise, emigrants from Benin, Ghana and Niger head to Nigeria. 
South  Africa  is  a  popular  destination  place  for  emigrants  from  Mozambique,  Swaziland, 
Lesotho, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Evidently, prospect for a better work plays a significant role 
in attracting these emigrants. In East Africa, Sudan is most common destination for emigrants 
from  Chad,  Eritrea  and  Ethiopia,  while  Kenya  is  a  popular  destination  for  emigrants  from 
Uganda and Tanzania, where the latter interestingly is a destination most favored by emigrants 
                                                 
10 The migration matrix reported in Table 4a and Table 4b are computed from country level data that are not 
adjusted for missing information which may bias to a certain degree the actual origin-destination pattern.    10 
from DRC, Zambia and Burundi despite the fact that the difference in level of per capita GDP is 
negligible or in some cases even source countries do better.  
 
Figure 2: Major migration corridors in SSA
   11 
 
When we take into account mobility of emigrants outside of Africa in the sub-regional matrix, 
we find that more than 90% of emigrants from North Africa, 63% from Southern Africa and 58% 
from Central Africa ended up in destinations outside of Africa suggesting that these three regions 
have better access to opportunities in OECD and Middle East countries (Table 4b).  
 
Table 4b: Sub regional emigration matrix including trans-Africa emigration (%) 












East Africa  30.9  9.8  8  17.6  0  33.7 
Central Africa  12.6  21  2.4  2.7  3  58.2 
North Africa  4.5  2.4  1.8  0  0.1  91.2 
Southern 
Africa  12.8  0  0  24.2  0  63 
West  Africa  2.1  4.3  0.4  0  58.6  34.5 
Total  12.9  6.8  3.1  7.1  18.7  51.4 
Source: Author’s computations based on the Migration Matrix data  
 
 
At a country level, France stands out as the most common destination country for emigrants from 
Africa (14%), followed by Cote D’Ivoire (9%), Saudi Arabia (8.1%), and South Africa and USA 
where each accounted for 5% of emigrants from Africa. Most OECD countries in the West had a 
share of African emigrants less than 3%. The total share of African emigrants living in Western 
Europe, Canada, USA and Australia is about 37%, which perhaps dispels the notion that the bulk 
of migrants from Africa are headed to these countries only. On the other hand, it should also be 
noted that these countries account for more than 65% of trans-continental migrants. In some 
sense, Western Europe, USA, Canada and Australia are the major destinations of emigrants who 
managed to leave the continent (Figure 3).  
 
There are some features evident in the migration pattern which may be helpful to grasp the cross 
country variations. The existence of a community of people in the country of destination to 
whom  a  migrant  can  identify  and  fit  easily  certainly  facilitates  migration.    Most  African 
countries share extensive commonalities along borders, sometimes cutting through four or five 
countries. It is well recognized that cross border movements are facilitated by common linguistic 
and historical roots. For instance, a large number of emigrants from Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia 
and Eritrea are found in the same region due to strong ethnic, religious and linguistic ties along 
the vast borders shared by these countries. Similarly, emigrants from Burundi and Rwanda easily 
can fit into the population in Uganda and Tanzania because of large ethnic group residing in 
these countries that speak the same language and share historical ties. In Southern Africa, it is 
easy  for  migrants  from  Lesotho,  Swaziland,  Mozambique  and  Botswana  to  blend  into 
communities in South Africa, making mobility and settlement comparatively easy for aspiring 
migrants. Cote d’Ivoire is a melting pot for neighboring countries as most migrants are able to 
communicate with people in the surrounding countries and share similar religious and historic 
bond. Migrants from Cape Verde headed principally to Portugal (29%), followed by USA (16%) 
and Mozambique (10%) to a certain degree due to the historical and linguistic roots as well as   12 
search of better opportunities. On the other hand, migrants from Equatorial Guinea typically 
headed to two main destinations, Gabon  (52%) & Spain (31%) which reflect colonial roots as 
well as economic boom in the wake of the discovery of  oil reserves in Gabon.  
 
Figure 3: Major destination countries for emigrants from Africa as proportion of total migrants(2010) 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on the Migration Matrix data  
 
The momentum for African emigration to OECD countries has been building up over the years 
and we may be in the midst of a major emigration surge catalyzed by demographic pressure, 
faltering  economic  growth  and  the  cumulative  effects  of  past  migrations  through  networks 
established over the years. Figures 4 show clearly that emigration rates from Africa to OECD 
countries continued to rise over the last three decades essentially outpacing rate of growth of the 
general population.  In contrast, migration   from other parts of the world to OECD countries 
witnessed some degree of slowing down particularly during the period 1995-2000. Most of the 
decline originated from Asia where emigration rates from China and India showed some respite 
in this period.  
 
Figure 4: Rate of emigration from Africa to OECD countries1975-2000.  
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Africa Other Regions  13 
The  long  term  factors  that  may  influence  the  pattern  of  emigration  from  Africa  to  OECD 
countries would be demographic and labor market pressures. According to recent projections 
(Table  5),  the  evolution  of  the  labor  force  across  the  globe  raises  serious  developmental 
concerns. In 2050, nearly all major industrialized nations are expected to experience a substantial 
deficit their labor force, particularly in the most productive age bracket, while currently poor 
regions such as Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia are expected to  witness a huge surplus 
particularly among the young.  The surge in labor surplus in Sub Saharan Africa is of particular 
concern as it would imply doubling of its current labor force and at a global level will be twice 
that of South Asia and India. The potential problem that may arise from such global imbalance in 
the labor market is significant to warrant dialogue and discussion early on to devise optimal 
policy coordination between labor surplus and deficit regions.  
 
Table 5: Change in the size of labor force in selected regions of the world during 2010-2050 (in million of 
people) 
Age group  SSA  NA  South 
Asia 
India  China  Europe  North 
America 
15-24  163.4  -10  25  -7.8  -67.6  -18.1  -10.8 
25-39  261.6  -4  130  92.3  -85.8  -36.7  -7.4 
40-64  274  -4  150  299  77  -33.4  1.2 
Total  699  -18  305  383.5  -76.4  -88.2  -17 
Source: adopted from Koettl (2010) 
 
Evidently, the growing wage gap between African and OECD countries would continue to be an 
important factor in the incentive to emigrate. The general impression on the progress of African 
economies in generating gainful employment is so far muted. Some even go as far as to say that 
recent growth in has been generally a jobless growth in which case the prospect for the young 
and  the  unemployed  can  only  be  found  in  emigration.  The  demographic  pressure  of  such 
magnitude could trigger waves of emigration from Africa as it narrows the resource base in the 
home country (see Hatton and Willamson, 2003).   
 
Demographic and labor market conditions are not the only determinants of emigration to OECD 
countries. The cumulative effect of past migration could also facilitate further outflows from 
Africa  because  of  several  factors.  Immigrants  living  in  OECD  countries  help  remove  the 
constraint of emigration to aspiring emigrants in the country of origin in many ways (Hatton and 
Willamson, 2007). They finance trips, facilitate legal entry through family-reunion programs, 
information and other assistance that reduce the burden of resettlement. Thus, it is plausible to 
expect  that  for  each  country,  the  number  of  previous  emigration  rate  could  create  its  own 
momentum that is self-sustaining. Figure 5 depicts the rising tide over the period for emigrants 
from Africa where each period emigration rate produces a larger flow of migrants in future.
11   
                                                 
11 We specified and estimated a  dynamic model on the evolution of emigration rate over time which indicated a 
presence of true state dependence which satisfies all the statistical requirements for absence of spurious correlation. 
This implies that past migration trends are strong predictors of future trends with a high propagation term. It also 
suggests that factors that determine emigration rate (such as demographic and labor market conditions) would have a 
much persistent effect in the long term Some of the control variables used for the estimation include differences in 
per capita income for each country in the sample with the OECD average, regional and time dummies as well as 
unobserved country specific factors,.    14 
Figure 5: Past and current rate of emigration to OECD countries from Africa: 1975-2000 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on Dockier and Marfour (2005) data set.  
 
Immigration in Africa 
Immigration to Africa by people born in regions outside of Africa is estimated at round 2.4 
million  in 2010, which is  about  16% of total  immigration into the continent,  the rest  being 
accounted for by migrants from the region. The most favored destinations by immigrants from 
within  Africa  are  Cote  d’Ivoure  (16%),  South  Africa  (12%)  and  Burkina  Faso  (6%).  For 
immigrants from regions outside of Africa, South Africa and Egypt rank ahead of the others as 
they  have  a  large  community  of  migrants  from  Australia,  Yemen,  West  Bank,  Lebanon, 
Philippines etc.  
Figure 6: Rate of immigration to Africa: 2010 
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3.  Understanding (explaining) cross country migration patterns in Africa 
Living standard and Intra-African Emigration 
Prospect for a better life certainly is one of the most important factors behind people’s decision 
to  migrate,  but  it  is  not  sufficient.  Ability  to  migrate  is  also  an  important  element  which 
introduces a threshold effect on the decision to stay or emigrate (HDR, 2009; Shaw, 2007).   
Differences in living standard explain a significant part of the variation in the rate of intra-
African migration. The pattern of migration by African emigrants depicted above suggests that 
countries  from  middle  income  countries  tend  disproportionately  to  migrate  to  destinations 
outside of Africa, whereas emigrants originating from poorer regions generally remained within 
the neighboring countries. To a certain extent, trans-continental migration may be impeded by, 
among other things, cost and related factors which could be a result of differences in living 
standards across countries. It is plausible to assume that emigrants from middle income countries 
have better chance of travelling far (outside of Africa) by being able to pay for transport, and 
other amenities in the destination country and may be better prepared to adapt to the environment 
outside of Africa, particularly in the developed Western countries. Figure 7 plots the proportion 
of emigrants that remained within Africa against log per capita GDP in constant price capturing 
this  possibility.  It  is  very  clear  that  the  poorer  the  country  is  the  higher  the  percentage  of 
emigrants staying within the continent. The relationship suggests that a 10% difference in per 
capita  GDP  could  lead  to  a  one  percentage  point  difference  in  the  proportion  of  emigrants 
staying  in  Africa
12. Certainly this is a large effect of per capita GDP on the capacity of 
prospective migrants to travel to distant places.  
 
Figure 7: Intra-African migration and per capita GDP(2006) 
 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on the Migration Matrix data and WDI (2009) 
 
                                                 
12 The strong correlation between per capita GDP and emigration rates should not be taken at its face value. We 
cannot rule out for the possibility that the association may be spurious driven by say a third factor that influences 
both in the same direction or it could even be due to measurement error correlated with per capita GDP.  
y = -0,1079x + 1,1921 


















































Log per capita GDP in constant prices (2005)    16 
This picture is consistent with similar plot generated from a different data source (Figure 8) 
where we have only emigration rate to OECD countries in the vertical axis plotted against log 
per  capita  GDP  in  PPP  terms  for  emigrants  from  Africa.  It  is  evident  that  middle  income 
countries generally have a high incidence of emigration to OECD countries
13. The implications 
of the strong association between per capita GDP and emigration rates to OECD countries are 
interesting. The first, straightforward, but less surprising implication is that poverty in Africa is a 
strong deterrent of mobility particularly to OECD countries. Secondly ,  if migration has a net 
welfare gain to the country of origin, then, the patterns we observe for Africa imply that 
migration could increase continental level of inequality, further exacerbating differences in per 
capita GDP across countries.  
Figure 8: Emigration rates to OECD countries and log per capita GDP in Africa (1990-
2000) 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on Dockier and Marfour (2005) data set.  
This simple correlation also implies that wage differentials alone do not explain migration trends, 
if it were one would have obtained a negative relationship between rate of migration and per 
capita GDP
14. If all prospective migrants have equal possibility and capacity to migrate, then, the 
lower the wage rate in the country of origin relative to country of destination, the higher the rate 
of migration would be. This possibility is captured in a crude form in Figure 9. Skilled migrants 
(people with at least tertiary education) from developing countries have high hopes and evidently 
also better access to trans-Africa emigration compared to less educated people. In other words, 
high wage differentia between poor African country and a rich OECD country is a possible cause 
for the high proportion of skilled migrants from poor countries.  
                                                 
13 The outliers are Cape Verde and Seychelles obviously small economies with one of the highest emigration rates in 
Africa.  
14 An important element emphasized in the literature is the role that “cost of migration” plays in affecting migration 
flows. See for instance, Hatton and Willamson (2003) and also Rosenzwig, (2005) who showed that apart from the 
cost of migration, for a given level of skill price, the higher the per capita GDP of a country, the higher becomes the 
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Depending on the direction of the welfare gain, emigration by the well educated, skilled people 
could be offsetting or reinforcing regional inequality. This is one of the intensely debated topics 
in the literature. From the perspective of the country of origin often it is argued that migration 
leads to depletion of the stock of human capital, particularly for highly specialized professions, 
such  as  medicine,  engineering,  law,  scientists,  researchers,  etc.  that  deprives  a  developing 
economy  of  skills  necessary  for  innovation,  technological  transfer  and  entrepreneurial 
development. While persuasive arguments along these lines are plenty (Bahgwati and Wilson, 
1989), some of the theoretical and empirical work shows interesting dynamics where prospect 
for international migration could generate a high demand for skill accumulation (education) for 
each cohort in the labor force (e.g Beine, Docquire and Rapport, 2001).  The unintended effect 
may very well be the opposite of “brain drain”, such as “brain gain” or in the extreme rising 
“educational unemployment” in most developing countries (Fan and Stark, 2007).  
It  is  very  important  for  policy  makers  in  the  country  of  origin  to  evaluate  and  respond 
appropriately to the medium and to long term implications of migration on the national economy. 
By all accounts, the size of skilled labor that Africa lost in the last decades was not a small fit. 
According to Shinn (2008), “between 1960 and 1989, an estimated 70,000 to 100,000 highly 
skilled African workers and professionals left for Europe and North America.  This constituted 
about 30 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s highly skilled personnel.  In 1984 there were 10,000 
Nigerian professionals in the United States alone.  Some 500,000 Sudanese, 80 percent of whom 
were skilled, worked abroad in 1985, mostly in the Gulf States.  Sudan became a labor exporting 
nation and had to fill the gap by hiring Egyptians.  In the first 30 years of African independence, 
the brain drain was a complicated phenomenon.  Most of the movement by professionals and 
other highly skilled persons was away from the continent.  Nevertheless, a few African nations 
like Nigeria in the 1970s and Botswana benefited by the arrival of well trained Africans from 
other countries”.  
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Colonial ties and Emigration in Africa 
 
Post  independence  Africa  maintained  close  economic,  political,  cultural  and  linguistic 
relationships  with  former  colonial  powers  that  continued  to  this  day.  Particularly  France, 
Belgium  and  United  Kingdom  cultivated  special  relationships  with  their  former  colonies  in 
Africa that included privileges  for travels, study and business opportunities.  It is easier for 
migrants from Francophone areas to travel to France and Belgium, those from Anglophone areas 
to UK and so on.  As time passed by, countries in the New World (USA, Canada, and Australia) 
as well as emerging economies within the continent such as South Africa, Egypt, Cote d’Ivoire 
and countries in the Gulf also became favorite destinations for African emigrants. Figure 10 
presents this trend where former colonial ties still continue to play some role as the most favored 
destinations for emigrants from Africa.  
 
Using the bilateral migration matrix, the vertical axis plots the proportion of African migrants 
that left for the former colonizers and the horizontal axis measures proportion of emigrants to the 
most common destination.  If for a given country the two sets match, then we have a plot that 
traces out the 45
0 line. We can see that for some countries, particularly for emigrants to France, 
while for others the commonest destination is different from former colonies
15. Generally the line 
tracing out the colonial tie is flat inclining towards the horizontal axis. Interestingly this trend has 
not  shown much change  over the  years. Preliminary  investigation   of  the earliest  bilateral 
migration matrix data constructed for Sub Saharan Africa by Russel et al (1990) suggest similar 
pattern where intra-African emigration dominate movement of people in the early 1970s and 
trans-African emigration tend to be to former colonizers.  
Figure 10: colonial link and emigration pattern in Africa 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on Dockier and Marfour (2005) data set. 
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Political instability and poor socio economic conditions 
 
One of the key features of emigration trends in Africa is the tide by relatively well educated 
labor force over time. Between 1990 and 2000 alone, emigration to OECD countries by the 
highly skilled increased at annual rate of 2.5%, while that of emigrants with some high school 
increased by 6.6% (Table 6). This picture is completely different from the trend in the early years 
of independence where the educated class had high hopes of the future and passionate about 
nation building that transcended search for personal gains and opportunities. We also note that 
the rate of emigration to OECD countries across all educational groups exhibited significant 
variation  across  countries  such  that  the  average  is  a  poor  indicator  of  the  overall  picture. 
Countries that had the highest skilled emigration rates were The Gambia, Cape Verde, Mauritius, 
Seychelles and Sierra Leone. These are particularly small economies which as argued above 
would  have  little  to  offer  particularly  to  the  skilled  in  terms  of  gainful  employment  and 
opportunities. The other possible reason for the increase in the rate of emigration particularly by 
the well educated is the bad state of political and socio economic conditions that characterized 
most African countries throughout recent history.  
 
Table 6 : Trends in emigration rate from Africa to OECD countries  
    1990        2000       
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
                   
Primary   52  0.0176  0.0396  0.0001  0.2261  0.0161  0.0323  0.0001  0.1866 
Secondary   52  0.0240  0.0563  0.0002  0.3518  0.0404  0.0595  0.0002  0.3744 
Tertiary  52  0.1624  0.1826  0.0017  0.8042  0.2019  0.1720  0.0048  0.6746 
Total emigration rate  52  0.0217  0.0469  0.0002  0.2541  0.0257  0.0449  0.0004  0.2511 
Source: Author’s computations based on Dockier and Marfour (2005) data set. 
 
Attempt was made to capture the significance of such adverse conditions as political instability, 
dictatorial  regimes  and  poor socioeconomic conditions  on the rate of emigration. Data from 
International Country Risk Guide, one of the authoritative sources on political and economic 
governance, along with emigration data of the World Bank (2007) was used to establish the 
associations
16. The result as shown in Table 7 clearly demonstrated that overall governance 
conditions indeed do matter for the rate of skilled emigratio n from Africa, explaining about 10 
percent of the overall variation with large individual coefficients even after controlling for 
differences in per capita income levels, time changes and unobserved country specific effects. 
Improving political conditions, governance, and adhering to basic democratic principles can stem 
the tide of emigration by the educated and skilled Africans
17.   
 
                                                 
16 Certainly we cannot rule out the possibility of the governance indicators to be endogenous in many ways. The 
fixed effects regression specification controls for the possibility of unobserved variables from being correlated with 
the error term. It is however possible that increased rate of emigration of skilled labor could lead to deterioration in 
the capacity of government often leading to dictatorial regimes or poor socioeconomic conditions. However the 
possibility of such reverse causation is remote at best given the small fraction of migrants in comparison to the 
overall population.  
17 Recent study suggested that poor socio economic conditions,  rampant poverty reinforce to explain the vicious 
cycle underlying most migration decisions (see Croix and Docquier, 2010)   20 
Table 7: Governance indicators and migration of skilled labor in Africa: fixed effect regression(1990-2000) 
Dependent variable (log rate of skilled migrant)  Coefficient  t-ratio 
Socio-economic conditions  -0.09514  -2.35 
External conflict  0.01675  0.46 
Military in politics  -0.08856  -1.83 
Religion in politics  -0.02126  -0.32 
Ethnic tensions  0.050461  0.91 
Constant  -1.65211  -4.47 
R2  0.11   
Source: authors’ computations. Regression controlled for time dummies and per capita GDP levels.  
 
4.  Socioeconomic characteristics of migrants from Africa: Evidence from household 
surveys 
 
What community and household characteristics are correlated with decision to migrate? 
 
Migration in economic theory is perceived  as a strategy by an individual or a household to 
maximize present value of current and future welfare given labor market and other institutional 
constraints
18. The fact that only 3% of the world’s population is able to migrate suggests that it is 
not a common practice and in most cases it is not an easy decision individuals alone make in the 
manner they decide labor market participation or sector of employment in their own country. 
Often it involves complex factors and actors other than the individual. In the context of Africa, 
richer versions of such a model   identified the role of the household and the community in 
making the rational decision based on careful evaluation of pay offs and costs (see for example, 
Bigsten, 1994; and Hoddinott, 1993 for illustration on Kenya). Thus, there is element of  self 
selection in the migration decision and it is right to expect some attributes of the individual, the 
household  and  the  community  to  play  a  decisive  role.  Understanding  these  determinants  of 
migration decisions is important for policy purposes.  
 
The evidence on determinants of migration at the micro level is available for Africa mostly for 
internal  migration  decisions
19. It is only   recently that household surveys begun to capture 
characteristics of households with an international migrant. For instance, the Ghana survey of 
2005/06 and the recently completed household survey through the African Migration Project are 
one of the rich sources of information that could help in identifying characteristics of internal as 
well as international migrants. The latter includes unique information on labor market attributes 
of the migrant in the place of origin as well as destination offering fres h insight on the 
implications of migration on employment outcomes.  
 
Analysis of these household survey data shows that migrants from these countries tend to be 
young adults, predominantly male and generally have some education beyond primary schooling 
(Table 8).  The sex, age and educational composition of migrants vary by whether migration is 
within the country, to neighboring countries, or to the OECD. Not surprisingly, migrants to the 
                                                 
18  See for example, Todaro (1969) and Borjas(1994) 
19 Earlier studies on Africa include Hoddinott (1994), Bigsten (1994), Lucas (1985). An exception is Azam and 
Gubert (2006) who studied internal as well as international migration in Mali in the Senegal River Valley.    21 
OECD generally tend to be older, well educated and more than 70% are men. There are some 
differences in the motive for migration among the countries covered in the survey. While seeking 
employment is the predominant reason for emigration from Burkina Faso, education and family 
reunion are cited as the reason for emigration by almost half of those interviewed.    
 
Table 8: characteristics of migrants from selected African countries: 2009  
Burkina Faso  
  Average Age  Men  Women  Primary  Tertiary 
Internal  31  50%  69%  53%  76% 
African Countries   32  49%  32%  46%  9% 
OECD Countries  35  2%  2%  2%  15% 
Total  31  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Senegal 
Internal  32  54%  45%  51%  50% 
African Countries   35  11%  18%  17%  6% 
OECD Countries  38  35%  37%  32%  44% 
Total  35  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Nigeria  
Internal  27  76%  82%  93%  87% 
African Countries   28  7%  5%  4%  3% 
OECD Countries  33  18%  14%  3%  10% 
Total  28  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Ghana  
Internal  34  72%  78%  85%  58% 
African Countries   35  5%  5%  8%  3% 
OECD Countries  37  23%  17%  8%  40% 
Total  37  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Source: data from the World Bank (2010)“African Migration Survey” 
 
 
Appendix  Table  1-4    provide  respectively,  a  snapshot  picture  of  determinants  of  household 
specific  and  community  characteristics  that  are  correlated  with  the  probability  of  having  an 
international  migrant  in  the  household  for  Ghana,  Burkina  Faso,  Senegal  and  Nigeria.  The 
variables  of  interest  were  selected  carefully  to  reflect  some  of  the  predictions  in  models  of 
migration decisions in a resource poor setting
20. In the extended models, migration is assumed to 
be a strategy that households  and the extended family sometimes that includes clan members 
living in risky environment adopt to diversify or self -insure risk. Thus, higher size of the 
household would facilitate such risk diversification strategies by sending abroad members with 
high earning potential. Often the education of the head of the household is considered to be an 
important element in facilitating outward migration as it assists the household to gather and 
process  relevant  information  necessary  for  international  migration.  Exis tence  of  networks 
provides  externality  to  the  members  thus  reducing  enormously  the  cost  associated  with 
assimilation and adjustment to the new environment.  
                                                 
20 E.g. Hoddinott (1993)   22 
 
In  Ghana,  having  an  international  migrant  in  the  household  is  closely  correlated  with  the 
following characteristics: The higher the education of the head and the parents of the head, the 
higher is the probability of having an international migrant. The marginal rate is about 8%, but 
the effect is dampened for households with relatively high wage rates.  This is a labor-market 
effect of migration decision. Families rewarded better through high pay generally have lower 
probability of sending out their family members abroad. The higher the size of the household, the 
higher is probability of having an international migrant which as argued above could be a result 
of risk-diversification strategy by households. Some areas have substantially higher international 
migrants  than  others  (Greater  Accra,  Ashanti).  This  may  be  a  result  of  network  effect  as 
settlements in most African countries are along ethnic lines. It is also important to notice that 
when  we  control  for  variables  that  proxy  earnings  through  level  of  education  attained  and 
employment status, we could not find significant direct impact of earnings on the probability of 
having an international migrant in the household.  
 
We  obtained  a  consistent  result  on  the  probability  of  a  household  to  have  an  international 
migrant for Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Nigeria from the recently completed household survey 
through the African Project. The probability that households with large family size have at least 
one person as a migrant, both internal and international, are significantly higher in all these three 
countries capturing partly the risk diversification motive as well as other factors that affect labor 
supply decisions. The probability is much higher for households with an international migrant in 
comparison to those with at least one internal migrant. Interestingly, families with small children 
generally tend to stay marking the life cycle effect of decisions to migrate. The age of members 
of the household seem to influence the probability of emigrating in the case of Senegal as it did 
in the case of Ghana (though migrants tend to be younger-see Table 8). The direct effect of 
schooling on decision to migrate is not evident in the case of Burkina Faso but significant in the 
case  of  Nigeria.  On  the  other  hand,  relatively  richer  households  tended  to  have  a  higher 
probability of having a family member as an international migrant in the case of Burkina Faso a 
result generally found to be the case in several micro studies in Africa.  
 
The survey data also provide information on the dramatic labor market effects of migration. In 
Burkina Faso and Nigeria, migration allowed a shift from self-employment, often in farming, to 
wage employment. In Senegal, the shift in labor market status is significant for students, many of 
whom were able to find wage employment due to migration (Table 9a). 
 
Table 9a: Labor market status of individuals before and after migration in selected African 
countries (2009)  
 Percent of total  Burkina Faso  Senegal  Nigeria 
   Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 
Self-Employment  80.3   64.1   42.2   42.7   15.7   25.6  
Full-Time Wage Earner  2.5   8.8   9.0   24.3   13.9   33.5  
Part-Time Wage Earner  1.5   12.2   3.3   4.2   2.7   4.1  
Student  10.2   5.4   20.6   7.6   42.5   23.2  
House Wife  2.9   5.1   9.4   7.6   1.3   4.9  
Unemployed  1.9   1.5   8.9   3.4   22.0   4.3  
Other  1.0   3.0   7.0   10.0   2.0   4.0  
Source: Authors’ computations   23 
 
The Burkina Faso survey shows a significant change in labor market status due to migration. 
According to Table 9b, nearly all migrants were farmers in their original place of residence, 
which is not surprising given that the survey was predominantly administered in rural areas. 
However, migration frequently resulted in changes in occupations. Internal migration was often 
from rural to urban areas, and only one third of internal migrants remained farmers (about half of 
international migrants continued as farmers).  While many internal migrants became traders and 
some even middle level managers, others ended up in unstable or casual employment.   
 
 
Table 9b: Occupation of individuals before and after migration in Burkina Faso (2009)  
  Before Migration  After Migration 
Occupation  Internal  International  Internal  International 
Professionals (managers  4.13  2.13  15.98  22.94 
Unstable occupations  2.17  1.77  10.55  5.75 
Farmer  85.71  91.6  36.37  58.79 
Semi-skilled workers  2.5  1.55  6.09  1.26 
Trader  4.45  2.39  20.85  6.8 
Other  1.03  0.22  5.48  2.46 
Note: total may not add up to 100% as some professions were not reported.  
Source: authors’ computations 
 
Finally, the survey data show that low rates of return: the share of émigrés who returned was 
only 3 percent in Nigeria, 9 percent in Senegal, and 25 percent in Burkina Faso (table 10).  The 
majority of those who do return in Burkina Faso and Nigeria come back in less than four years.  
In Senegal, however, 66 percent of returnees had 15 or more years abroad.
21  
 
Table 10: Return migration in selected African countries 
  % who returned in less 
than 4 years 
% returned during 5-
15 years 
% returned after 15 
years 




67  16  16  25 
Nigeria   69  23  8  3 
Senegal  32  2  66  9 
Source: authors’ computations 
 
   
                                                 
21 see also Azam and Gubert ( 2005) for  more discussion on the pattern of migration in rural 
Senegal.   
   24 
 
5.  Some policy implications  
 
Migration  in  Africa  is  part  and  parcel  of  the  broader  agenda  for  economic  integration  that 
involves intra-African trade and investment. The policy challenge often raised with respect to 
migration is whether it is possible to attain optimal welfare gains (in terms of both efficiency and 
equity considerations) for all involved. The empirical literature generally provides a favorable 
view of migration as it impacts positively the economy of country of origin through flow of 
remittances and in some cases skill and knowledge transfer; and the country of destination by 
maintaining stable labor market conditions that is necessary for growth. In the case of Africa, 
particularly  Sub  Saharan  Africa  the  bulk  of  emigration  is  south-south,  often  across  borders, 
which in some ways can be regarded as an extension of the pattern of internal migration. It is not 
known to what extent such pattern of migration has impacted the economy of country of origin 
as well as destination (see also Shaw, 2007).  
 
Migration episodes that responded to incentives for economic opportunities generally are part of 
the working of market forces in bridging excess demand in factor or goods markets thus allowing 
efficient  allocation  of  resources  and  fostering  greater  economic  integration.  Despite  lack  of 
evidence, it is plausible to expect that south-south migration is followed by increased trade flows 
and adjustment of labor markets in both sending and destination countries, which both play a 
crucial  role  in  promoting  growth  and  ensuring  employment
22.  The  more  formal  and 
institutionalized flows of migration become, the greater economic integration will be and its 
benefits. The full benefit of such mobility of labor can be realized only if co ncerned national 
governments are able to jointly manage and coordinate the flow of migrants and protect basic 
rights for the entire duration of their stay. There are incidents of extortion, abuse and exploitation 
of  migrants  bound  to  other  parts  of  Africa  as  both  legal  and  illegal  migration  became 
commercialized (Lucas, 2006; Shaw, 2007). Limited or lack of  well functioning financial 
intermediaries inhibit the flow of remittances thus reducing their potential impact on household 
welfare. There are also a wi de range of issues on property rights, licensing of businesses and 
transfer of funds that African governments have not harmonized to encourage immigrants to 
engage in investment activities. Certainly this translates into areas of intra -African trade and 
investment  which  has  not  improved  much  over  the  years.  In  principle,  greater  economic 
integration helps to stem the flow of migration and limits its size and composition to what is 
allowed  by  economic  fundamentals.  The  regional  economic  unions  such  as  the 
COMESA,ECOWAS, EEC, SACU, SADEC,   have been around for the greater part of post -
independence  Africa  and  yet  their  effectiveness  in  managing  migration  flows  is  still  not 
sufficient.  
   
Transcontinental emigration from Africa is gaining momentum in recent decades, particularly by 
the highly educated groups. Even if African economies in general have done well in the last 
decade, the demographic and economic pressures to migrate particularly to OECD countries are 
still strong and have been building up over the  years.  There is a sufficiently large literature 
devoted to the study of whether emigration of skilled labor is a potential source for “brain drain” 
                                                 
22 Recent World Bank (2010b) report suggests that in Southern Africa region, generally wage rates follow that of 
South Africa with some lag for adjustment. Certainly the degree of adjustment is better for economies that are 
closely integrated with South Africa.    25 
or “brain gain”. While the empirical evidence is inconclusive as it depends on several sets of 
factors, there are still avenues for policy makers to avert possibilities of a vicious cycle between 
underdevelopment  and  skilled  emigration  (Croix  and  Docquier,  2010).  For  typical  African 
country,  poor  governance,  bad  socioeconomic  conditions,  political  persecutions  seem  to  be 
strongly correlated with incidence of skilled emigration although these factors do not seem to 
have a significant bearing on overall incidence of emigration to OECD countries in a systematic 
way,  or  on  those  with  lower  or  middle  level  education.  It  is  also  possible  that  large  scale 
emigration  by  the  well  educated  could  contribute  to  worsening  socioeconomic  conditions 
including poor quality of public service, etc. creating the vicious circle between development and 
skilled labor emigration. Such possibility brings the need for policy coordination by national 
governments  of both  origin  and destination countries  to  determine and manage the size and 
composition of migrants.  
 
Tightening immigration policy alone is not the solution to stem migration. Some of the well 
established theories of migration explicitly or implicitly imply that migration is a temporary 
phenomenon  that  would  stabilize  once  the  country  of  origin  attains  a  certain  level  of 
development. For instance, Hatton and Willammson (2009) provide a historical parallel to what 
is often in the literature called the Migration Hump, where the tide of migration from Western 
Europe in the 19
th century turned into a trickle after a couple of decades. The effectiveness of 
coordinated  policy  response  could  be  dramatic.  According  to  the  data  that  we  have,  skilled 
emigrants from Africa to OECD countries do not seem to do very well in comparison to those 
emigrants from other regions (Figure 11). Immigrants of African origin generally have a very 
high labor market participation rates and yet their unemployment rates is one of the highest and 
certainly higher than the national average for OECD countries.  If conditions improve in the 
country of origin, the potential for migrants to return home could be high. This is compelling for 
Africa since the effect of modest improvement in economic and political conditions at home 
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6.  Summary and conclusions 
 
 
Africa,  particularly  Sub  Saharan  Africa  is  one  of  the  regions  with  the  lowest  incidence  of 
emigration despite the mounting demographic and economic pressures to emigrate. The average 
however masks significant variation across countries. Smaller countries generally tend to have 
one  of  the  highest  emigration  rates  in  the  world.  Generally,  net  migration  rates  varied 
considerably across time and countries due mainly to the difficult history of the continent that is 
shrouded with conflict, coups, insurgencies, dictatorship and war. As shown in previous studies
23 
migration in Africa remained predominantly a south -south phenomenon, particularly in Sub 
Saharan Africa and has shown little change in the last few decades.  West Africa continues to 
dominate as a sub-region with the highest mobility rate since the early 1970s, partly due to better 
coordination of immigration across nat ion states, deeper historical roots and relatively better 
integrated sub-region even in colonial times (see also Russel et al, 1990).   East Africa has been 
dominated by a flood of refugees for long time. South Africa served as a main destination for 
emigrants  from  Lesotho,  Swaziland,  Botswana,  Mozambique  and  Zimbabwe.  The  end  of 
apartheid further increased emigration from other sub-regions also.  
 
Trans-Africa emigration is typical of emigrants from North Africa where more than 90% of them 
headed to destinations outside of Africa, predominantly Europe, Middle East and North America. 
Poorer countries generally tend to have low incidence of emigration and typically they send 
proportionately  higher  skilled  labor  outside  of  Africa.  Particularly  interesting  is  t hat  the 
proportion of emigrants that leave the continent is higher in middle income countries as opposed 
to poor ones. On the other hand a larger share of skilled emigrants come from poor countries 
emphasizing the point that such barriers as distance, language, legal requirements  play a major 
factor in influencing migration pattern in Africa.   
 
Political economy factors play a significant role in determining emigration by educated people. 
Over  10%  of  the  cross -country  variation  in  skilled  emigration  in  Af rica  is  due  to  bad 
socioeconomic conditions and dictatorial political systems, after controlling for country-specific 
unobserved factors. Improvements in anyone of these indicators are associated with an elasticity 
of about 0.4 which is quite significant.  This effect is not evident for other categories of 
emigrants, particularly to OECD countries. 
 
Past emigration patterns to OECD countries seem to have cumulative effect in facilitating current 
emigration. This state dependence of emigration rate is not spurious as examined by appropriate 
diagnostics tests and is strongly evident for less educated emigrants.  Colonial link seem to have 
persisted to this day. Half of African countries reported that the most favored destination for 
emigrants are former colonies, a trend that seem to have persisted over time.  
 
 From the micro data, it was possible to observe that generally the motive for migration is 
economic  opportunity  as  well  as  attempt  to  diversify  risk  by  households  living  in  risky 
environment. As a result, the characteristics of households that have at least one international 
migrant in Ghana for instance indicates that the size of the household, network externalities, 
education of the head of the household play a major role. Similar finding is also report ed for 
                                                 
23 For example, Page and Plaza (2006), Lucas(2006) and Shaw(2007)   27 
Burkina  Faso,  Senegal,  and  Nigeria  where  the  probabilities  for  a  household  to  have  an 
international migrant are highly correlated with such characteristics as size of the household, 
level of living standard and to a certain extent religious affiliations. Preliminary findings suggest 
that  the  labor  market  effect  of  migration  is  evident  in  Africa.  Migrants  generally  change 
occupations and in most cases find jobs that require some degree of skills.  
 
Going forward, the demographic dynamics expected to prevail in different regions in the next 
decades raise a serious concern on the nature of the global labor market as well as its implication 
to migration pressures. Developed regions such as Europe and North America are expected to 
experience a decline in the size of their labor force, particularly within the younger cohort at a 
rapid rate, generating a large deficit that would raise the stake for continued growth, maintaining 
healthy fiscal balance and caring for the elderly (Koettl, 2010).  On the other hand, Sub Saharan 
Africa is expected to witness a surge in the labor force, particularly within the younger age 
bracket, which put enormous pressure on the propensity to emigrate as it may come on the back 
of weak economy, narrow resource base and fragile institutions (Hatton and Willamson, 2003).  
 
Reconciling  global  imbalance  in  the  labor  market  requires  serious  attention  and  policy 
coordination in a number of areas. Despite domestic efforts to reform labor markets, and improve 
labor productivity, Europe, North America and to a certain extent China may have to rely on 
immigration to meet growing shortfall in labor force. However, the degree to which available 
labor force is compatible with the needs of the labor market becomes central. Projected demand 
indicate that middle level  skills  tend to  be in  great  demand and acquiring  compatible skills 
remains a challenge to most emigrants from African countries.  
 
Issues of migrant integration, social protection and improved financial services to transfer funds 
also become an integral part of the migration policy. Often, the contribution of immigrants to the 
advancement of the country of destination depends on the environment conducive to settle and 
blend with the native population. Possibilities for transferability of pension funds to country of 
origin or other benefits, access to cheap and convenient means of remittances all have a major 
role to play in the migration policy in the years ahead (Koettl, 2010).      28 
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Appendix Table (1): Determinants of international migration in Ghana: 2005 
  Coefficient  Standard error 
Size of the household  0.003735**  [0.0410] 
Age of the Head of the household  0.000596  [0.135] 
Log of schooling attained  0.081388***  [2.55e-09] 
Log of schooling * log hourly wage  -0.003574**  [0.0257] 
Head is unemployed  -0.012027*  [0.0948] 
Log hourly wage (mean 2.7)  0.005537  [0.184] 
Regional dummies     
Central  0.027708  [0.156] 
Greater Accra  0.045257**  [0.0123] 
Volta  -0.024812*  [0.0830] 
Eastern  -0.0039  [0.796] 
Ashanti  0.084490***  [1.20e-05] 
Brong ahafo  0.03311  [0.113] 
Northern  -0.032159*  [0.0666] 
Upper East  -0.046521***  [0.00904] 
Upper West  -0.043897**  [0.0252] 
Psuedo-R2  0.098   
Observations  5475   
Source: author’s computation based on Ghana LSMS 
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Appendix 2: Household and community characteristics correlated with probability of migration in Burkina Faso-
2009 (multinomial regression with the household with no migrant is used as a base) 
 
Household size  1.087***  [0.018]  1.120***  [0.017] 
Household size squared  0.997***  [0.000]  0.996***  [0.000] 
Dependency ratio  0.853  [0.171]  0.350***  [0.066] 
Dummy for male  0.959  [0.059]  0.966  [0.056] 
Religion is Islam  0.936  [0.076]  0.838**  [0.064] 
Religion is Protestant  1.055  [0.166]  0.923  [0.139] 
Religion is Traditional  0.824*  [0.088]  1.05  [0.103] 
Anemist  0.439  [0.220]  0.070**  [0.073] 
Ethnic group (Mossi is the reference group)     
Peulh/Rimaïbé  0.924  [0.096]  0.919  [0.092] 
Dioula  0  [0.000]  1.058  [0.877] 
Bobo/Bwaba  0.371***  [0.128]  0.778  [0.207] 
Bissa  1.207  [0.153]  1.166  [0.145] 
Samo  0.739**  [0.090]  0.906  [0.102] 
Dafin/Marka  0.500**  [0.156]  0.881  [0.228] 
Dagara  2.033***  [0.559]  1.307  [0.369] 
Lobi  0  [0.000]  0.412  [0.479] 
Bobo-Dioula  0.181***  [0.112]  0.486*  [0.182] 
Gourounsi  0.728  [0.181]  1.365  [0.270] 
Touareg/Bella  0.121**  [0.129]  0  [0.000] 
autres  1.066  [0.160]  0.722** 
[0.011] 
Gourmantché  0  [0.000]  0  [0.000] 
farmer  1.011  [0.071]  0.933  [0.062] 
Consumption quintile (poorest is the reference group)   
quintile2  0.884  [0.079]  1.370***  [0.119] 
quintile3  0.929  [0.083]  1.188*  [0.106] 
quintile4  0.781**  [0.075]  1.128  [0.106] 
quintile5  1.078  [0.111]  1.691***  [0.167] 
Primary  0.932  [0.088]  0.892  [0.080] 
Secondary  0.772*  [0.102]  0.887  [0.106] 
Above secondary  0.64  [0.207]  0.727  [0.205] 
Age: 25-34  0.99  [0.075]  0.939  [0.068] 
Age: 35-44  1.027  [0.088]  0.962  [0.079] 
Age: 45-54  0.963  [0.079]  0.991  [0.076] 
Constant  0.681**  [0.110]  0.834  [0.127] 
Observations  7,924    7,924   
Model chi-square  315.8    315.8   
df  66    66   
Loglikelihood  -8506    -8506     32 
Pseudo R2  0.0182    0.0182   
N of observations  7924    7924   
Source: authors computation based on Migration Survey through the African Project 
 
 
Appendix Table 3: Household and community characteristics correlated with probability of migration in Senegal-
2009 (multinomial Logit regression with the household with no migrant is used as a base 
 
  Internal Migrant  International Migrant  Internal/International migrant 
Household size  1.121***  [0.022]  1.137***  [0.017]  1.268***  [0.028] 
Household size squared  0.997***  [0.001]  0.998***  [0.000]  0.997***  [0.001] 
Age squared  0.939***  [0.018]  0.951**  [0.019]  0.918***  [0.024] 
Age squared  1.001***  [0.000]  1.001**  [0.000]  1.001***  [0.000] 
Dummy for male  0.595***  [0.050]  0.670***  [0.055]  0.546***  [0.065] 
Dummy if religion is Catholic  1.145  [0.293]  1.038  [0.288]  1.922  [0.867] 
Dummy for ethnic group(reference is Bambara)           
diola  0.632  [0.276]  0.211***  [0.100]  3.076  [2.754] 
mancagne  1.655  [2.027]  3.624  [4.318]  0  [0.000] 
mandingue/socé  0.333**  [0.168]  0.73  [0.310]  0.665  [0.716] 
manjaque  0.080***  [0.070]  0.938  [0.525]  0  [0.000] 
pular  0.287***  [0.102]  0.415***  [0.140]  1.171  [0.923] 
sarakholé/soninké  0.387**  [0.168]  0.438**  [0.175]  0  [0.000] 
sérer  0.306***  [0.113]  0.384***  [0.135]  0.58  [0.467] 
woloff  0.276***  [0.097]  0.527*  [0.174]  1.04  [0.813] 
balante  1.454  [1.384]  0  [0.000]  0  [0.000] 
autres  0.216***  [0.090]  0.218***  [0.087]  0.159*  [0.157] 
Dummy for education (reference is no schooling)           
Primary  0.973  [0.198]  0.896  [0.149]  0.769  [0.293] 
Secondary  0.861  [0.235]  0.649*  [0.157]  0.372  [0.233] 
Technical  0.579*  [0.178]  0.643*  [0.146]  1.3  [0.549] 
Tertiary  2.078***  [0.555]  1.088  [0.268]  0.541  [0.410] 
Occupational dummies (Reference is self-employed)         
Administrative officer  0.857  [0.212]  1.285  [0.279]  1.216  [0.513] 
Commercial officer (sales representative)  0.656*  [0.161]  1.602**  [0.308]  1.458  [0.558] 
Agricultural extension worker  0.622***  [0.098]  1.347**  [0.200]  1.066  [0.254] 
Engineer of agriculture  0.703**  [0.106]  0.931  [0.142]  0.901  [0.203] 
Agricultural or industrial worker  0.733**  [0.114]  0.873  [0.136]  1.088  [0.256] 
Casual employment  0.873  [0.162]  1.358*  [0.245]  0.494**  [0.171] 
Military officer  0.733*  [0.118]  0.912  [0.147]  0.78  [0.198] 
NSP  4.087***  [0.662]  0.623***  [0.096]  5.061***  [1.325] 
Dummy for regions (Reference is Dakar)             
diourbel  6.679***  [1.829]  0.826  [0.262]  10.911***  [4.108] 
fatick  3.228***  [0.580]  0.649**  [0.112]  2.825***  [0.824]   33 
kaolack  1.610*  [0.449]  0.374***  [0.113]  0.604  [0.329] 
kolda  3.992***  [0.725]  0.813  [0.144]  3.885***  [1.134] 
louga  2.383***  [0.459]  0.673**  [0.121]  2.252***  [0.680] 
matam  1.846***  [0.353]  0.894  [0.148]  3.298***  [0.952] 
st-louis  1.614*  [0.442]  1.345  [0.309]  0.587  [0.307] 
tambacounda  2.222***  [0.367]  0.418***  [0.074]  3.598***  [0.954] 
thies  2.888***  [0.983]  0.818  [0.339]  0.515  [0.382] 
Constant  2.656*  [1.391]  2.252  [1.146]  0.068***  [0.065] 
Observations  4,717    4,717    4,717   
Model chi-square  1189    1189       
df  114    114       
Loglikelihood  -5566    -5566       
Pseudo R2  0.0965    0.0965       
N of observations  4717    4717       
Source: authors computation based on Migration Survey through the African Project 
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Appendix Table 4: Household and community characteristics correlated with probability of migration in 
Nigeria-2009 (multinomial Logit regression with the household with no migrant is used as a base 
 
Variables  Internal Migrant  International Migrant 
Household size  1.030***  [0.009]  1.068***  [0.013] 
Dummy for male  0.848**  [0.065]  0.753***  [0.070] 
Number of years in school squared  1.103***  [0.025]  1.147***  [0.037] 
Number of years in school squared  0.996***  [0.001]  0.996***  [0.002] 
Dummy for urban areas  0.487***  [0.046]  0.383***  [0.037] 
Marital status (Reference is married)         
Engaged to be married  1.569**  [0.354]  3.036***  [0.791] 
Cohabiting/Consensual Union  3.369  [3.030]  0  [0.000] 
Separated  1.577  [0.613]  1.5  [0.706] 
Divorced  0.755  [0.271]  1.083  [0.756] 
Widowed  2.099***  [0.263]  3.281***  [0.548] 
Single/Never Married  0.874  [0.127]  0.595***  [0.104] 
Religion (reference is Islam)         
Catholic  0.88  [0.132]  1.04  [0.187] 
Protestant  1.179  [0.153]  0.791  [0.121] 
Pentecostal  1.231  [0.613]  1.388  [0.688] 
Traditional  0.806  [0.249]  1.977**  [0.610] 
Ethnicity (Reference is Hausa)         
Yoruba  1.563***  [0.218]  56.411***  [20.113] 
Ibo  3.473***  [0.600]  56.649***  [20.808] 
Efik/Ibibio  2.749***  [0.526]  38.184***  [14.331] 
Ijaw  2.691***  [0.557]  97.856***  [35.842] 
Nupe  0.337***  [0.054]  0.025***  [0.019] 
Bini/Esan  1.969***  [0.404]  84.938***  [32.346] 
Other  1.393***  [0.179]  10.518***  [3.512] 
Age group (Reference is 15-24)         
25-34  1.06  [0.132]  0.921  [0.142] 
35-44  1.392**  [0.200]  1.352*  [0.240] 
45-54  1.599***  [0.276]  1.820***  [0.419] 
55-64  2.294***  [0.403]  2.968***  [0.693] 
64+  3.620***  [0.687]  6.109***  [1.522] 
Constant  0.160***  [0.031]  0.001***  [0.001] 
Observations  8,103    8,103   
Model chi-square         
df  55    55   
Loglikelihood  -5637    -5637   
Pseudo R2  0.164    0.164   
N of observations  8103    8103   
Source: authors computation based on Migration Survey through the African Project   35 

















Eastern Africa  -1,09  -0,65  0,39  -1,56  1,2  -0,9  -1,1 
Burundi   -2,83  4,33  -0,11  -8,6  -13,02  5,5  8,1 
Comoros  5,68  -2,14  -1,83  0  0  -3,4  -3,1 
Djibouti  56,77  5,65  38,49  -10,95  6,57  0,0  — 
Eritrea  0  0  0  -22,42  -0,23  11,3  2,3 
Ethiopia  -11,77  3,21  3,54  3,35  -0,15  -1,0  -0,8 
Kenya  -0,04  0,04  0,05  1,74  -0,15  0,2  -1 
Madagascar  -0,71  -0,17  -0,13  -0,09  -0,04  -0,1  -0,1 
Malawi  -0,35  -0,3  20,95  -17,13  -0,93  -0,5  -0,3 
Mauritius  -4,41  -5,45  -5,77  -1,28  -0,35  0,0  — 
Mozambique  1,54  -5,89  -19,46  9,79  1,01  -0,2  -0,2 
Réunion  -9,54  0,72  -0,62  2,68  2,45    — 
Rwanda  -2,18  -3,96  0,48  -57,56  61,49  0,1  0,3 
Somalia  59,79  -25,37  -16,06  -21,86  1,71  -5,1  -5,6 
Uganda  -2,7  -1,56  3,11  1,44  -0,6  0,0  -0,9 
Tanzania  -0,25  0,36  0,57  4,16  -1,25  -1,9  -1,4 
Zambia  0,19  1,51  0,85  -0,16  1,74  -1,5  -1,4 
Zimbabwe  -3,08  3,74  2,71  -3,28  -0,25  -11,2  -11,1 
Central Africa  0,2  -0,43  -0,09  3,71  -3,27  0,2  -0,2 
Angola  0,58  6,12  -3,41  2,83  -2,07  2,3  0,9 
Cameroon  1,45  -1,05  0,46  -0,08  0  -0,1  -0,2 
Central African 
Republic 
-0,09  3,25  -2,94  2,38  0,64  -2,3  0,2 
Chad  -5,37  -3,14  1,53  0,63  2,73  4,8  -1,4 
Congo, Rep  0  0,11  0,18  1,05  2,6  0,2  -2,8 
Congo, Dem, Rep,  0,77  -2,31  0,43  5,9  -6,4  -0,9  -0,3 
Equatorial Guinea  -26,85  48,77  0  0  0  5,3  3,1 
Gabon  6,17  5,31  4,53  3,88  2,43  1,5  0,7 
Sao Tome and Principe  -2,53  -10,68  -4,42  -3,24  -2,86  -9,6  -8,8 
Southern Africa  -0,05  0,73  0,39  0,25  -0,26  2,4  2,4 
Botswana  -2,05  -1,66  -1,54  -1,01  -0,86  2,2  1,6 
Lesotho  -3,27  -2,27  -7,28  -7,37  -4,15  -3,7  -3,5 
Namibia  -9,16  -5,39  11,78  0,46  2,27  -0,1  -0,1 
South Africa  0,54  1,16  0,25  0,81  -0,16  3,0  2,8 
Swaziland  -2,95  0,33  5,98  -8,37  -109  -8,4  -1 
Western Africa  0,4  -0,8  -0,71  -0,71  -0,45  -0,4  -0,6 
Benin  -4,85  -3,75  -3,23  1,84  -3,2  2,7  1,2 
Burkina Faso  -6,73  -5,98  -3,07  -2,66  -2,3  1,6  -0,9 
Cape Verde  -17,37  -11,11  -10,1  -4,65  -2,42  -5,5  -5,1 
Côte d'Ivoire  11,07  9,11  4,35  2,98  0,8  -3,7  -1,4 
Gambia  7,29  7,01  10,53  8,78  7,42  4,4  1,8   36 
Note: negative values indicate inflows exceed outflows and vice versa for positive values. Country classifications 
are based on UNPD (http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=5#Africa) and may not fit to those  used  by 
the African Development Bank or the World Bank.  
Source:  Lucas (2006) and UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population 
Prospects: 2010 Revision 
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